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1 (1) 2011

Matching algorithm of the auctions on Ebay


Author - Affiliation:
Nguyen Van Phuong - Post & Telecommunications Institute and Technology at Ho Chi Minh City , Vietnam
Corresponding author: Nguyen Van Phuong - kim.npt@ou.edu.vn

Abstract
This paper explores eBay auction properties that match buyers and sellers and generates millions of sales every month. eBay’s auction is now a well known mechanism designed to make buyers and sellers feel comfortable doing business without meeting each other. In a theoretical point of view, the current matching algorithm has not solved the online auction problems because the main conditions of agents’ preferences do not satisfy when bidders are unobservable and a set of bidders is not identified. Therefore, we construct a new simplified model of matching with a given object for sale to form a seller-bidder pair to overcome the online auction issues. Specially, our model may extend for the matching mechanism of the job market.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.46223/HCMCOUJS.econ.en.1.1.113.2011
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